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Two Views of the Question: Are 
Law Schools Doing Their Job? 
Remarks of Robert B. McKay* 
581 
Thank you, Peter. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, friends. 
You have all heard the criticisms of lawyers, which I need not 
rehearse to this audience. Critics range from Aristotle, Jesus, Shake-
speare, and Samuel Johnson to Jimmy Carter and Derek Bok; the 
cast of characters goes on and on. The criticism I like best, although 
in a way it is the most cutting of all, is what Samuel Johnson is 
alleged to have said about two centuries ago: "I do not like to 
speak ill of any man behind his back but I do believe he is a 
lawyer." 
It is always easy to bring people together, nonlawyers at least, 
to talk about the sins of the legal profession, and lawyers will be 
glad to join in talking about the sins of legal education. The latter 
is our topic today, not necessarily the sins but the strengths and 
weaknesses as they may have developed over the past 20, 30, 50, 
or 100 years. It is ordinarily difficult to gather a group to talk 
about legal education as such. Even law faculties are not eager to 
talk about the premises of legal education and whether we are 
succeeding or failing in what we seek to do. They are always quick 
to talk about whether classes should begin in August or September, 
whether contracts should be four or five or six hours, and important 
matters of that character; but when you come right down to the 
guts of it, what it is we are all about, the reluctance becomes 
apparent. What is the purpose, what is the objective of legal ed-
ucation, and are we succeeding or failing? That is a much more 
difficult and much more tender subject that we tend to shy away 
from. So I congratulate the planners of this conference on having 
the courage at least to ask us to address that question and to 
persuade this many of you to come out and talk about it on what 
is obviously a promising Friday in the fall. 
The origins of legal education in the United States were very 
humble, and the ambitions were exceedingly modest. Before the 
Revolution there were no law schools in the United States. Gentlemen 
of the day (but no gentleladies) who got any education at all other 
than apprenticeship got it in the Mother Country. The first pro-
fessorship of law was at William & Mary College when Thomas 
Jefferson appointed George Wythe to that post. There followed 
• Professor, New York University School of Law; president, Association of the Bar of 
the City of New York. 
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other appointments at Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and the University 
of Maryland; but a single professorship does not a law school make. 
The first real law school, of sorts anyway, was that at Litchfield, 
Connecticut, which had a curriculum that was surprisingly modern, 
at least in terms of the names of the courses offered-property, 
contracts, torts, agency, commercial law. But it was a proprietary 
school, and although its thousand-plus alumni over a period of years 
became very distinguished in the early American bar-Vice President 
of the United States, Supreme Court justices, leaders of the bar-
it was destined not to succeed; it gave way to university law schools, 
including one at nearby Yale University. 
Law schools scarcely survived the Civil War and the rigors of 
that period; it was not until late in the nineteenth century that there 
were any law schools of really substantial merit that we would 
consider at all modern by present standards. There was, of course, 
the development of the case method, commonly attributed to Chris-
topher Columbus Langdell at Harvard in 1890; from that time, 
roughly, the modern period of legal education begins. But even until 
well into the twentieth century the principal route to practice was 
the apprenticeship method, which you in New Jersey know full well 
from the experience many of you have had with it. It was not until 
the 1920's and later that the developments in legal education we 
are going to talk about today became the standard fare even in the 
best law schools. 
Thus legal education in the United States is a relatively young 
discipline. For instance, when I started law school at the University 
of Kansas in 1940, the curriculum did not sound very different from 
the Litchfield curriculum of 150 years earlier. And the teaching 
method was not very different from what it had been at Harvard 
in 1890 when the case method was first established. Even when I 
began teaching in 1950 there was not that remarkable a change in 
legal education throughout the country. That is not to say that it 
was not well done, but the system was considered tested and sound. 
Vast changes have occurred since that time. 
Let me talk first about the demography of legal education. And 
when I talk about law schools, I will be talking principally about 
the 174 that have been accredited by the American Bar Association. 
The number of law schools has increased from the time I entered 
teaching in J950~from 112 to 174, which is more than a fifty 
percent increase. Even more striking is the number of law students. 
The low year for enrollment after the post-World War II surge was 
1953, when the number of students in law schools was just over 
30,000. That has increased to more than 120,000 at the present time. 
There has been a small dip in the fall of 1984 entering class, a 
matter to which I shall return. 
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Until the late 1960's and early 1970's, the rapid surge in enrollment 
was almost entirely from white males. Since then the number and 
proportion of white males has declined each year. In 1983-84, the 
last year for which we have figures, 37.7% of all J.D. candidates 
in law schools approved by the American Bar Association were 
women, and nearly ten percent were minorities, with obviously some 
overlap between those two figures. In a number of law schools, a 
majority of all the students are women while the number of minorities 
varies quite substantially from school to school. 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that the size of the bar has 
increased dramatically in recent decades, to the concern of many 
lawyers. There are now nearly 700,000 lawyers eligible to practice 
in the United States. In 1982 there were more than 45,000 new 
admissions to law practice. Although that may include a few who 
previously had been admitted to another bar, it is unquestionably 
a substantial increase from previous years. The bar is young now. 
Well over half of all present members have been admitted within 
the last ten or fifteen years. So, the character of the bar has changed 
dramatically. Most who are now admitted to practice have come 
from the recent period of legal education that I will call the modern, 
or some might call the post-modern, era. 
The increased numbers raise the question of whether there are 
too many lawyers, a frequent subject in bar association discussions. 
I find that those already admitted to practice and current law students 
who believe they will be admitted within the next two or three years 
are all inclined to think that there are too many lawyers and that 
the time has come to reduce the flow in some way, either as to 
the number of law schools, the number of students admitted, the 
number of students allowed to graduate, or the number passed into 
the bar. 
Just coincidentally, and I attribute no special significance to it, 
the number of lawyers has risen at almost exactly the same rate as 
the increase in the number of inmates in prisons and jails in the 
United States. I would not mention that too freely in a nonlawyer 
audience because some conclusions might be drawn that I hope are 
not appropriate. 
There has been growth in every department of the law schools. 
When I first taught at Emory Law School in Atlanta in 1950, I 
thought it was a great law school, although a small law school, 
with an entering class of about thirty students in the day, about 
the same number in the evening, and a library of about 20,000 
volumes. During the three years I was there, I did not get through 
even all of those works, but today Emory has nearly 200,000 volumes; 
a small law library now is considered to be one of only 150,000 
volumes. So the law library, which is after all our laboratory, has 
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become a major part of the process and a major part of the cost. 
As you all know, the cost of books and serials has surged far ahead 
of the rate of inflation. 
In the past decade alone, more than 100 law schools have moved 
into totally new facilities or into substantially renovated facilities. 
So the "edifice complex" is a significant factor on the law school 
scene. Nearly all law schools are housed well, I believe. And some 
of them have magnificent facilities. 
Legal education in the United States is now big business. Tuition 
alone, at public and private law schools, was close to half a billion 
dollars in 1983-84. And by the time you add in the private con-
tributions and public subsidies (law schools are not profit centers), 
I suspect the budgets of all the law schools realistically computed 
would be over a billion dollars a year. That is not an inconsiderable 
amount of money. 
Law faculties have inceased in numbers very substantially. In 1973, 
almost half of the approved law schools in the country had student-
faculty ratios in excess of thirty-five to one. Ten years later, only 
three law schools had faculty ratios in excess of thirty-five to one. 
The average is something below thirty, which is the figure that the 
American Bar Association accreditation standards recommend. That 
means that the size of the law faculties has increased at least as 
fast as, and possibly faster than, the size of the student bodies 
which they serve, putting pressure on law schools to satisfy even 
the office space needs of all members of the faculty. 
Statistically, I think it is quite easy to say that legal education is 
a success story, and you may be sure that legal educators ordinarily 
will report these figures to demonstrate how impressive their ac-
complishments have been. But there are emerging problems, some 
clouds on the horizon as well. Applications for law school admission 
declined in 1983 and 1984, and we know that there are some unfilled 
seats in some law schools around the country-primarily private law 
schools in the urban centers. Law schools with reduced populations 
are inclined to say, "Yes, we have a smaller first year class because 
we wanted it that way; we wanted to improve our student-faculty 
ratio." I like to believe that is in fact true. 
It has become somewhat more difficult, but not yet, I think, 
strikingly more difficult, to place law school graduates. For at least 
some law schools, that is becoming, or soon may become, a serious 
problem. And finally, the increasing cost pressures on both public 
and private institutions may well force some economies on legal 
education of a kind we have not known during the last fifteen or 
twenty years, which have been the golden years for legal education 
in this country in terms of expanding faculties, increasing services 
to students, increasing loan funds, increasing law libraries, and enhanc-
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ing all the things that at least in quantitative terms go to the measure-
ment of quality in legal education. 
More important, I think, than the changes in demography are the 
changes in the nature of the legal education process. It is my 
contention that there have been more changes in the way legal 
education is conducted in the last fifteen years than in the previous 
150 or 200 years. For example, we have long talked about, and in 
the 1920's sometimes did something about, bringing some of the 
humanities, the social sciences, and interdisciplinary programs into 
the law school. We are now doing an increasing amount of that; 
probably it is still not enough, but increasing attention is given to 
joint degree programs, social science programs, and interdisciplinary 
programs both in the law school and in other university departments. 
Specialized topics receive increased attention and increased quality 
of instruction as faculties have more experience in what is sometimes 
called the real world. The curriculum is more luxurious now, in 
nearly all law schools, than it was even as little as two decades ago. 
Law school publications have expanded in numbers and in pages. 
You are well aware I am sure of the now hundreds of legal periodicals 
that come out of the law schools around the country. Some schools 
have three, four, perhaps even five periodicals. It may be that the 
volume is so great that little is read, but that is not the entire point. 
Part of the point is that these are very effective tools for the teaching 
of research and legal writing. This is at least a partial answer to 
the frequent complaints about insufficient attention being given to 
writing skills. In addition, more effort is being spent upon teaching 
all students to write more effectively. At New York University, for 
example, we now have twelve writing instructors for the first-year 
program, and we treat seriously the question of the skills of com-
position and organization of legal thought. 
Perhaps the most dramatic change has come in the field of skills 
training and advocacy. It has been welcomed with mixed enthusiam · 
around the country, but now it has become a standard fixture in 
almost all law schools: serious clinical training, much of it by live-
client training, with much of the balance done by simulation. These 
are not show-and-tell programs; they offer practical experience in 
dealing with everything from negotiation to actual advocacy to the 
ethical problems of representing clients in criminal or civil cases. 
The increased attention being given to professional responsibility 
training represents another important development in legal education. 
When most of us went to law school, if there was a legal ethics 
course or a legal profession course or a professional responsibility 
course, it was probably not selected by many students, and it may 
have been taught by a practitioner who used war stories to illustrate 
a lesson of "how you do it without quite violating the code of 
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professional responsibility," instead of "how you uplift the moral 
quality of the practice of law." For eleven or twelve years now, 
the American Bar Association standards have required that every 
law school off er to every law student a course in professional 
responsibility. It is now treated as a serious subject. I believe, at 
least I hope, that there is a quality of moral uplift in contemporary 
courses that was absent in the past. 
Other changes include the emphasis upon affirmative action. About 
1966 or 1967, New York University and other schools discovered 
that even though we prided ourselves on admitting students without 
regard to race, sex, or color, the result was that we were having 
one or two or three minority students in a class, at my school, of 
about 330 to 360. Obviously, that was not good enough for the 
profession and not good enough for the country. Since that time 
there has been affirmative action in virtually all schools in recruiting, 
in advertising the advantages of legal education to those who had 
not been served by the profession as a whole in the past, and in 
attempting to assure an opportunity for successful placement. For 
a time affirmative action seemed to be necessary as well for women, 
who also had been a very small proportion of the student body up 
until about that same time; but now about forty percent of all 
American law students are women. 
The bureaucracy of legal education also has increased very sub-
stantially over time. There are three instruments of what I call the 
bureaucracy of legal education. The Association of American Law 
Schools (AALS), which is the intellectual arm of the legal education 
profession, at one time played a very active part in setting the 
standards for law school training, but does so now on a consultative 
basis to the American Bar Association's Section of Legal Education 
and Admissions to the Bar. The AALS largely confines itself now 
to matters having to do with the nature of the law school educational 
program, the training of law teachers, and the printing of materials 
about legal education in the Journal of Legal Education and else-
where. The ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the 
Bar has emerged as the dominant actor in the accreditation process, 
which is especially important because of the unique situation of the 
legal profession. Unlike every other profession, the legal profession 
has a monopoly on its professional process. It is what I call a 
cradle-to-grave monopoly. Admission to law school is determined 
by lawyers (law teachers). Graduation from law school is determined 
by the same collegial body. Admission to the bar is determined by 
lawyers as bar examiners and courts (sometimes with participation 
by the legislature, dominated in this respect by lawyers). Finally, 
discipline also is controlled by lawyers. Not even the health profes-
sions have as tight a control over the standards for admission to 
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practice and for continuing to practice. This puts upon the bar a 
heavy responsibility to assure quality in standards of admission, 
continuing education, discipline, and standards of lawyer competence. 
The American Bar Association's section is the officially recognized 
accreditation body for the law schools, which are the nearly exclusive 
vehicles for legal education in the United States. Recommendations 
from the section go to the ABA House of Delegates for final action. 
The section also arranges for all the accreditation procedures, in-
cluding the visit to each school roughly every seven years, the 
inspection of new law schools, and the advice given to nonaccredited 
law schools as to what they need to do to become accredited. Perhaps 
the most important function is the setting of standards. What has 
happened over the last twenty years in particular is that the standards 
have been raised gradually so that it has become more difficult now 
to be an accredited law school than it was at any earlier period in 
terms of student-faculty ratios, quality of library, quality of physical 
facilities, nature of the relationship with the rest of the university 
(protections against financial exploitation by the central campus), 
affirmative action, professional responsibility, clinical training, and, 
most recently, the use of some kind of tenure-like standard for 
clinical teachers. 
All these things have come through the ABA section. Obviously, 
there is some law school resistance from time to time. Some schools 
ask why they should be regulated by the eighteen-member section 
and the ABA House of Delegates. Moreover, they ask why they 
should be subjected to periodic inspections that are undoubtedly 
burdensome. The answer, I believe, is that the quality of legal 
education has been increased substantially by virtue of this insistence 
upon heightened standards, all undertaken during a period of pros-
perity for legal education when it was possible to make advances. 
So we now have stronger student bodies, better qualified faculties, 
vastly improved libraries, and superior physical facilities. If the 
quality of legal education has not improved as a result, then we 
have only individual faculties to blame. Maintenance of standards 
is reinforced, of course, by requirements in nearly all states making 
it impossible to take the bar examination without graduation from 
a law school approved by the American Bar Association. What that 
has meant in addition is that the number of unapproved schools 
has diminished sharply over the years. Only a small minority of 
students graduate from such schools now as compared with a much 
larger number twenty years ago. The result has been a bootstrap 
sort of lifting of the quality of legal education and a reduction in 
the number of schools that do not meet what we believe to be the 
desirable standards. 
Now I come finally and briefly to the purposes of legal education 
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and where we are. I think perhaps you understand my basic thesis 
from what I have said already, but let me summarize my overall 
position on the obligation of individual law schools and the collective 
responsibility of legal education, which I think is somewhat different 
and somewhat larger. First, individual law schools still have an 
obligation to train our graduates to "think like lawyers." Now I 
have often objected to that expression because it is a very circular 
statement, but it is a kind of a code expression that we all understand 
contemplates quality of reasoning, fact analysis, and problem iden-
tification and solution, especially where the question is unfamiliar. 
Second, our graduates must be trained for competence. That is, 
our graduates must be able to write, to think, and to understand 
the research tools of the law, including now, in most law schools, 
the new computerized technologies. This has to do with the com-
plaints that have been advanced by Chief Justice Burger, Judge 
Kaufman, and others that lawyers in litigation at least are substan-
tially incompetent. You will recall the response of the bar, saying, 
"It's not fifty percent as you said, Mr. Chief Justice; it's really 
only about twenty percent who are incompetent." Obviously, that 
is an unsatisfactory answer to a serious charge. 
Third, we have an obligation to instill in each of our graduates 
a sense of moral responsibility, an obligation to clients, to the 
profession, to the courts, and to the public as a whole. This may 
be difficult to do because our students come to us as mature 
individuals whose moral sensibilities are shaped already. But I am 
satisfied that we can at least reinforce existing value systems and 
try to discourage the more cynical attitudes that sometimes come 
with the study of law. 
Fourth, each law school also has an obligation for research and 
law reform within its particular jurisdiction-community, state, re-
gion, or nation-through the work of the faculty, work of the 
students in cooperation with the faculty, through its periodicals, 
through work with bar associations, through work with law reform 
commissions, and through work with legislative bodies. Law faculties 
and their students are an important resource for betterment of the 
law. 
The collective responsibilities of legal education are ones that I 
already have suggested. Let me enumerate them briefly again. Through 
the accreditation process, the standards for legal education must be 
maintained at a level that will ensure that each law school admits 
and graduates only those students who are qualified in terms of 
competence, professional responsibility, and analytic skills for the 
effective and honorable practice of law. 
How well are we doing? Law firms remain somewhat critical of 
legal education and the performance of recent graduates; but I note 
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that law firms come to the law schools in increasing numbers to 
buy-and I use the word advisedly-our graduates with offers of 
high pay in a great many instances and with attractive opportunities 
for summer employment among· other things. The competition some-
times seems almost obscene in the pricing and the entertainment 
that is offered to at least the strongest law students. 
Legal education is far from perfect. Harvard's president, Derek 
Bok, in his 1982 Report to the Harvard Board of Overseers, identified 
a number of the issues and alleged deficiencies of legal education 
and of the legal profession as a whole. The reaction of educators 
and lawyers in general has been somewhat defensive. But when the 
system is charged with excessive cost and delay, and when we are 
reminded that the adversary system carries burdens as well as benefits, 
I suggest that we must consider those points seriously. We must be 
ever alert for ways to improve the quality of justice of which the 
law is the chief custodian. 
* * * 
Remarks of Terrance Sandalow* 
The question you have been convened to consider, whether law 
schools are doing their job, cannot be answered without addressing 
a prior question: What is the job of law schools? It is the prior 
question that I propose to consider, not the question how well the 
schools are doing. It may be useful to state briefly my reasons for 
avoiding the latter question. 
Despite the confident assertions that we have grown accustomed 
to hearing, I doubt that anyone knows enough to assess the per-
formance of all law schools. I am certain that I do not. There are, 
at present, approximately 175 accredited law schools in the United 
States. They graduate more than 35,000 students each year. The 
range of schools is very great, from national law schools whose 
names are familiar to all to little-known schools that have a very 
precarious existence. Although all are engaged in educating pro-
spective lawyers, their circumstances and their missions vary widely. 
They differ markedly in financial resources, in the characteristics of 
their student bodies, and in the programs of instruction that they 
offer. Their graduates follow very different career paths. Nearly all 
graduates of the national law schools, for example, enter the prof es-
sion in practice situations in which they work under the supervision 
© Copyright reserved 1985 by Terrance Sandalow. 
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of senior lawyers who provide training beyond that offered in law 
schools. The largest number of graduates of many other schools 
begin their careers as solo practitioners or in other practice settings 
in which additional training is more difficult to acquire. At still 
other schools, substantial numbers of graduates enter both types of 
practice. Different schools, it seems plausible to suppose, do more 
or less well in equipping students for one or another of these practice 
settings. 
The variety of professional tasks that lawyers are called upon to 
perform adds another dimension that would have to be examined 
if the performance of law schools were to be assessed, tasks that 
range from routine real estate closings to the trial of extraordinarily 
complex antitrust cases, from legislative drafting to the processing 
of criminal cases in overcrowded urban courts, from tax counseling 
for multi-billion dollar corporations to litigating the intimate issues 
that arise in domestic relations cases. There is little reason to suppose 
that law schools do equally well in preparing students for each of 
these and for the myriad other responsibilities that lawyers undertake 
in the United States. The picture is further complicated by the 
variousness of positions that even a single lawyer may occupy over 
the course of a career, positions in governmental, commercial, in-
dustrial, financial, and educational institutions as well as in varying 
practice settings involving innumerable legal specialties. An assess-
ment of how well the schools are doing surely would require a 
judgment about the extent to which their programs contribute to 
or retard the professional mobility of their graduates. 
In the face of this diversity among the law schools and in the 
careers of their graduates, generalizations about how well the schools 
are doing their jobs are less likely to be solidly grounded in reality 
than to reveal the limited perspectives and biases of the speaker. 
We must consider also that we lack reliable information about many, 
perhaps most, of the relevant particulars. An answer to the question 
would, for example, depend at least partly upon an assessment of 
how well judges and lawyers are discharging their responsibilities. 
It hardly need be said that we lack adequate information for such 
an assessment. We also lack adequate means of estimating the extent 
to which the strengths and weaknesses of the bench and bar, whatever 
they may be, are attributable to legal education and the extent to 
which they are a consequence of other factors in the environment 
in which lawyers work. In short, the paucity of reliable data regarding 
either professional performance or the relationship between prof es-
sional performance and legal education puts an answer to the question 
whether law schools are doing their job beyond our present capacity. 
It may be, indeed, that a satisfactory answer to the question is 
in principle beyond our grasp. I have been assuming, correctly I 
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believe, that in asking the question whether law schools are doing 
their job, your convenors intended to raise the issue of how well 
the schools are doing in training young men and women to be 
lawyers. The implicit premise is that the performance of the schools 
should be measured by the performance of the bar. For reasons 
that will appear, I have difficulty with the premise, but even if that 
measure of the law schools' performance were accepted, answering 
the question whether law schools are doing their job would pose a 
formidable task, and perhaps an impossible one. There is, to put 
the point bluntly, too little agreement within the profession and 
within the larger society regarding the desirable characteristics of 
lawyers. It is worth recalling that not many years ago the American 
Bar Foundation, as part of a larger project on legal education, 
undertook to describe "the competent lawyer." The project foun-
dered at the outset because of the inability of the lawyers consulted 
to agree upon the characteristics necessary to or desirable in "a 
competent lawyer" and how they should be weighted. 
A single illustration will help to explain the difficulty. It is a 
common complaint, often made by lawyers though perhaps more 
frequently by laymen, that lawyers are overly zealous in representing 
their clients. The aggressive, single-minded pursuit of client interests, 
it is often argued, disables lawyers from seeking solutions to their 
clients' problems that are just both to clients and to those with 
whom the latter have dealings. In addition, the argument continues, 
the adversarial stance of lawyers prevents them from searching out 
opportunities for accommodating and composing differences. Law 
schools are often blamed for this asserted characteristic of lawyers. 
The emphasis on litigation in most law school courses, it is said, 
leads students, at a minimum, to perceive conflict only in adversarial 
terms and too often as though it were a zero-sum game. 
Yet, many lawyers argue that aggressive representation of com-
peting interests offers our best hope for the just resolution of 
controversies. Lawyers who take this position concede, of course, 
that the pursuit of client interests must take place within the frame-
work of legal rules that define a lawyer's ethical obligations, but, 
they maintain, within those rules lawyers ought to be, and young 
lawyers too infrequently are, single-minded in the advocacy of their 
clients' interests. This asserted failing of young lawyers is attributed 
to the law schools, which, it is said, fail to instill in their students 
an appreciation of the importance of zealous devotion to the client's 
cause, focusing instead upon the just resolution of controversies. 
Is it not clear that this debate is less about legal education than 
about the question, over which the profession is increasingly divided, 
whether (or of the extent to which) lawyers should assume respon-
sibility for the just disposition of the various matters in which they 
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become involved? Is it not also clear that the professional debate 
about the proper conduct of lawyers reflects an even deeper cultural 
division regarding the desirability of aggressive behavior and the 
relative weight to be given the competing claims of individual and 
community and of self-interest and altruism? 
In the face of professional and societal disagreements such as 
these, it is difficult to imagine what standard might be employed 
to determine whether law schools are doing their job. Some observers 
may, of course, wish to evaluate schools on the basis of a judgment 
about whether the schools are guiding students toward one or another 
conclusion, but those who understand the aims and potential of 
university education will appreciate the inappropriateness of doing 
so. The task of legal education is not to lead students toward 
particular answers respecting socially controversial issues, but to 
enable them to think about the issues more deeply than they otherwise 
might. It is, in any event, unlikely that law schools could do more 
even if they were to make the effort. I do not mean to suggest 
that what occurs in law schools has no effect on the attitudes that 
young lawyers adopt toward the performance of their professional 
responsibilities, but it is naive to suppose that three years of legal 
education will have a decisive influence on the behavior of most 
law school graduates. Even if law faculties were of one mind re-
garding the issues, a wildly improbable supposition, too many other 
factors are at work that overpower whatever influence three years 
of legal education may have. 
Students come to law school as adults. Their personalities, the 
ways in which they deal with other people, and their attitudes toward 
human conflict are a good deal less malleable than seems to be 
supposed by those who look to legal education to shape students 
to a particular professional mold. To be sure, the determinants of 
lawyer behavior are not irrevocably fixed prior to the first day of 
law school, but to the extent that the relevant personal characteristics 
and attitudes of fledgling lawyers are still being shaped, lessons 
learned in law school about the appropriate behavior of lawyers are, 
for nearly all students, likely to be much less influential than what 
they learn from observing the behavior of practicing lawyers. It 
should not be surprising that the lawyers encountered in summer 
clerkships and in the early years of practice are the models to whom 
students and young lawyers look for clues about how they ought 
to conduct themselves. After all, it is those lawyers, not members 
of law faculties, who face the questions that students and young 
lawyers confront in practice and who lead the lives to which the 
latter aspire. 
I want to emphasize that I am not arguing that law faculties are 
without influence upon the ways in which law is practiced. Schol-
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arship may affect some lawyers' understanding of their responsi-
bilities. Questions posed in law school classrooms, it may be hoped, lead 
students to reflect upon their responsibilities as lawyers and upon 
prevailing practices among members of the bar, perhaps affecting 
their conduct in practice. But the effects of scholarship and of 
lessons taught in the classroom are, at a minimum, significantly 
shaped by the characteristics students bring to law school, by the 
circumstances of their practices upon graduation, and by the lessons 
taught by senior lawyers. Any effort to assess the performance of 
law schools by assessing the performance of the bar merely ignores 
these latter influences. 
Since I do not want to spend all my time on what law schools 
cannot do, let me turn to the question, "What is the job of law 
schools?'' I suspect most lawyers and laymen would not consider 
that a very difficult or a very interesting question. The job of a 
law school, I take it most would say, is to train people to be good 
lawyers. In an article published last year,' I argued that this common 
sense definition of the purpose of legal education is too narrow. 
Students, I maintained, are not merely instruments to be shaped in 
accordance with someone's conception of how they can be made 
most useful to their future clients or how they can be made to serve 
best someone's conception of social utility. The students are them-
selves the end of the educational process. The proper object of a 
legal education, as of any other form of education worthy of the 
name, is to enlarge the capacity of students to realize their human 
potential. It should aim not merely to equip students for the eight 
or ten or twelve hours a day in which they will be performing in 
professional roles, but to assist them in developing character traits, 
intellectual skills, and an understanding of law and its place in 
human society that will enrich their lives and enhance their capacity 
to act as moral beings. A good legal education is in this sense a 
continuation of a liberal education. To be sure, its focus is narrower 
than the undergraduate education that we commonly associate with 
libera'.l education. But like a liberal education, its main object is to 
enable men and women to think clearly, to feel intelligently, and 
to act knowingly. 
The arguments for this conception of legal education and what 
I think it entails for the programs of law schools are set forth in 
that article. Rather than repeat what I have written elsewhere, I 
want to address the concerns of those who fear that the conception 
of legal education advanced in that article places too little emphasis 
on training for the professional responsibilities that students will 
bear upon graduation from law school. Don't law schools, critics 
I. The Moral Responsibility of Law Schools, 34 J. LEG. ED. 63 (1984). 
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of that conception ask, have a responsibility to the public to graduate 
competent lawyers? Law schools are, after all, the only portal through 
which all lawyers must pass. Doesn't that impose upon law schools 
an obligation to assure that their graduates are competent to practice 
law? Those who ask these questions seem to suppose that once it 
is acknowledged that law schools have an obligation to produce 
competent lawyers, a program of instruction automatically follows. 
They maintain that since lawyers negotiate, schools must offer train-
ing in the skills of negotiation; since lawyers argue in court, schools 
must offer training in the skills of trial advocacy; and since lawyers 
require knowledge of law office management, that too should be 
taught in law schools. I am reminded of one wag's comment that 
if a carload of lawyers on their way to a bar association meeting 
were killed in an accident, there would be those who would argue 
that law schools should begin programs of driver education. 
The question how law schools can best contribute to improving 
the quality of the profession is, however, a good deal more difficult 
to answer than has been appreciated by those who have been urging 
a greater prof essionalization of law school curricula in the interest 
of lawyer competence. A serious effort to answer the question would 
require, first, that we identify the qualities of good lawyers. It would 
require also that we consider the extent to which law schools are 
capable of assisting students to develop the qualities identified. In 
answering the latter question, account would have to be taken of 
the limited resources of law schools. I have in mind not only limited 
financial resources, but the limits of our most important resource-
the time, energy, and attention of students. Because our resources 
are limited, we need to direct them toward the educational objectives 
with respect to which law schools have a comparative advantage. 
The inclusion of trial practice and other "skills" courses in the 
curriculum cannot, in other words, be justified merely by demon-
strating that the skills and knowledge they off er students will make 
the students better trial lawyers. One wants to know also whether, 
taking account of the other settings in which such skills and knowl-
edge might be acquired (e.g., in practice or continuing legal education 
programs), the school's resources might better be devoted to assisting 
students in gaining knowledge and capacities that are less likely to 
be acquired outside an academic setting. 
The task of defining the qualities of a good lawyer is complicated 
both by the absence of a professional consensus and by the diversity 
of positions that lawyers occupy in our society. The two are, of 
course, related. Lawyers with differing tastes, values, and skills tend 
to migrate to different types of practice. Similarly, lawyers in dif-
ferent types of practice may require different skills or the same skills 
in different degree. Law students, however, do not neatly sort 
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themselves by school according to their future specializations and 
practice settings. Among the graduates of my school, for example, 
some are to be found in every practice setting and in every specialty 
that exists in the United States. Studies that we have undertaken 
reveal that the largest number of our graduates practice in settings 
and in specialties other than they had anticipated when they entered 
law school or even upon graduation. Many, indeed, practice spe-
cialties and draw upon knowledge that did not exist when they were 
in school. It seems to follow that if legal education is to be shaped 
by the demands of practice, law schools must, if they are to do 
their job, equip their students for a wide range of unknown careers. 
If legal education is to be shaped by the responsibilities lawyers 
are called upon to assume, some attention also must be given to 
the frequency with which lawyers hold important positions of public 
leadership. Among the graduates of my school, which in this respect 
is surely not unique, one currently is a governor, nearly a dozen 
serve in the Congress, a larger number serve in state legislatures, 
and many hold policy-making positions in the executive branches 
of federal, state, and local governments. A still larger number hold 
judicial office. Even those who do not hold public office often play 
an important public role, as political leaders, as ranking executives 
of corporations, or simply as citizens. 
Despite the variousness of lawyers' careers, I think there are some 
qualities that are constitutive of the idea of ''a good lawyer,'' qualities 
whose importance transcends particular practice settings and spe-
cialties and that are central to discharging the other responsibilities 
that lawyers so frequently assume. A list of those qualities, not 
coincidentally, is identical with the list of qualities that, in my earlier 
article, I maintained were the proper concerns of legal education 
because of their importance in enabling students to realize their 
human potential. The list does not exhaust the qualities that law 
schools should help their students to develop, but it will serve to 
indicate the direction that, in my judgment, law schools should take 
in discharging their responsibility to produce competent lawyers. 
What are the qualities that I have in mind? 
They are, first, a number of virtues associated with the word 
"character": courage, patience, perseverance, and other qualities that 
are necessary to maintain steadfastness of purpose in the face of 
life's vicissitudes. Every lawyer who has practiced law for any length 
of time knows the importance of these qualities. For reasons that 
I have already suggested, I do not believe that law schools can do 
much to develop these qualities in their students, but they do have 
some capacity to reinforce-and, it should be acknowledged, to 
weaken-traits of character that students bring with them. We need 
to do what we can-more, I believe, than we have been doing-to 
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assist students in strengthening those traits that are necessary to the 
moral life, which is not quite the same as attempting to fashion 
the students in our image of moral persons. 
Lawyers also require a range of intellectual skills and qualities. 
Some are comprehended by the no-longer fashionable phrase "think-
ing like a lawyer." They include the skills of analysis and synthesis, 
the ability to read with care and with attention to the nuances of 
language, the capacity to identify the premises of an argument, and 
the ability to reason in an orderly fashion from those premises. Law 
schools have, of course, traditionally devoted a good deal of attention 
to the development of these skills, and many lawyers regard that 
development as the most valuable part of their legal education. There 
are, however, other intellectual qualities that lawyers require and to 
which law schools have perhaps paid too little attention. They include 
the capacity to avoid certain common hazards to clear thought: 
provincialism of time and place; excessive reliance on familiar cat-
egories of thought; an inability to tolerate uncertainty; sentimentality; 
and self-interest. The importance of that capacity, if lawyers are 
adequately to represent their clients and perform their other re-
sponsibilities, is too obvious to require extended discussion. Surely, 
it must give pause, to take but a single illustration, that the American 
Bar Association recently promulgated Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct announcing that confidential information relating to the 
representation of a client is an inviolable trust whose secrecy must 
be maintained unless divulgence would serve the lawyer's personal 
interest. 2 What is one to think of the ability of those who voted 
for this conclusion to examine arguments objectively, free from the 
distorting influence of self-interest? 
A good lawyer is, finally, defined in part by his or her knowledge 
and understanding of the law. I do not mean that good lawyers 
require familiarity with all the evanescent detail of the law, even in 
their areas of specialization. But a good lawyer does have an un-
derstanding of the guiding principles of our legal system. That 
understanding consists in part of a knowledge of legal rules, but it 
plainly involves something more. The additional element is what 
experienced lawyers have in mind when they say that a lawyer has 
a "feel" for the law, or a "feel" for what is right, in a particular 
situation. Without it, no lawyer can adequately counsel clients or 
argue effectively in court or before an administrative agency. Despite 
the vagueness with which this added element of understanding is 
often described, there is nothing mysterious about it. It consists of 
an understanding of the social context of problems, of the rela-
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983). 
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tionships between law and society, of the forces that make for stability 
and change in the law, and of our evolving societal morality and 
ideals. A good deal of that understanding is intuitive or, at best, 
the product of unsystematic observation. A century ago, no other 
sources of understanding were available. More recently, however, it 
has become possible for lawyers to draw upon the learning of other 
disciplines-such as economics, psychology, and sociology-that have 
begun to investigate systematically many of the questions that law, 
and therefore lawyers, must confront. 
The knowledge and techniques of other disciplines have become 
part of the intellectual environment within which lawyers work. One 
need not suppose that they off er an answer to all, or even very 
many, of the issues that lawyers address to recognize their impor-
tance. The practice of antitrust law or environmental law requires 
some knowledge of economics. An understanding of statistics is 
required by those who practice labor law. Even more traditional 
areas of legal practice have not escaped the influence of other 
disciplines. Adequate representation of clients in domestic relations 
cases, for example, depends upon some familiarity with modern 
psychology and sociology. 
There are reasons other than the professional demands of particular 
specialties for believing that lawyers require an understanding of 
other disciplines. Lawyers who lack a sense of the direction of the 
law and an understanding of the ways in which political, economic, 
. and social forces affect that direction and the pace of change are 
not likely to represent their clients effectively. A lawyer's "sense of 
direction," even today, is likely to be mostly intuitive, but in the 
modern world even our intuitions are in some measure shaped by 
the social sciences. Lawyers need an understanding of the source of 
those intuitions and of the limits of other disciplines if they are to 
represent their clients effectively. Some familiarity with history and 
other humanistic disciplines is equally essential if intuition is to be 
educated. A knowledge of legal history may, for example, help to 
deepen a lawyer's understanding of law's responsiveness to social 
forces or the prevailing climate of ideas. Familiarity with another 
legal system may help lawyers to appreciate more fully the part that 
particular laws and legal institutions play in their own system. 
If I am right that an understanding of law, of the kind I have 
briefly described, is essential to being a good lawyer, the implications 
for legal education are clear. Law schools ought to devote themselves 
to cultivating that understanding among their students. Achieving 
that understanding is, of course, the work of more than three years 
or even a lifetime, but it is in educating students to undertake the 
quest that law schools can make their most important contribution 
to the profession. No doubt, lawyers also require other skills and 
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knowledge. Lawyers who try cases must know how to introduce 
documents into evidence and how to frame questions for cross-
examination. Nearly every lawyer engages in negotiation and, there-
fore, must be skilled in the art if clients are to be adequately 
represented. The comparative advantage of law schools, however, 
is surely not in training students in the skills of negotiation and 
trial advocacy. I am not even certain that these skills can be developed 
as effectively in law school as in practice, but even if they can, it 
is in educating students for a broad understanding of the law that 
schools have a comparative advantage, It is in undertaking to perform 
that function that the schools can most effectively "spend" their 
scarcest resource~the time, energy, and attention of students. 
